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The topic of election security has dominated news cycles throughout the country 
in the wake of one of the most contentious elections in American history. As technology 
continues to develop, become more accessible, and integrate with electoral processes, 
each election cycle introduces new laws and ways for registered citizens to vote. We 
now see a diverse range of voting methods used throughout the country, such as vote-
by-mail/absentee ballots, early voting, and even voting through an online portal for a 
select few Americans. Each separate method in each state/county utilizes different 
machines, security checks, and rules and regulations. With such a high degree of 
complexity comes questions about the technological security of American elections. In 
order to guarantee the fundamental democratic principle of fair and free elections, 
election security must be ensured such that each voter can be confident that their vote is 
counted as intended. Throughout the following sections I will highlight the 
technological risks inherent in the United States’ core election infrastructure to make 
recommendations on how to further improve the technological security of American 
elections. I will accomplish this by defining core features of the electoral system, 
 
iii 
including the different voting methods and machines used throughout the country. 
During this discussion I will address plausible security flaws in each method/machine’s 
structure. I will show how these flaws could, and have, been exploited by detailing both 
studies conducted on voting machines/processes as well as the foreign and domestic 
security risks posed by the events of the 2016 presidential election. Finally, I will make 
recommendations on how to improve the technological security of elections throughout 
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Chapter 1: Background 
Elections Clause 
Article I Section 4 Clause 1 of the United States Constitution gives states the 
power to decide how to run their electoral processes. From voter registration and ballot 
collection to the counting of election results, each state has their own election 
regulations. Often referred to as the “Elections Clause,” the Constitution reads: 
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature 
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such 
Regulations, except as to the Places of choosing Senators. 
An analysis of the Elections Clause reveals that the federal government leaves much of 
the power of deciding the “times, places, and manner” of voting in both federal and 
local elections to each individual state. The Constitution dictates that Congress can only 
override state laws through Constitutional Amendments such as the 15th Amendment, 
which guarantees the right to vote to all men regardless of “race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude.”1 Congress can also pass laws to pursue the goals stated in each 
Amendment, a famous example being the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which aimed to 
actualize the goals of the 15th and 19th Amendments. Federal courts up to the Supreme 
Court decide the Constitutional legitimacy of voting laws passed by Congress and the 
states. 
 Due to the nature of each independent state prescribing their own methods of 
voting, the United States ends up with an incredibly mixed bag of voting laws and 
processes employed throughout the nation. The largest degree of variance comes with 
                                                 




which machines or methods states use to collect, count, and store ballots, as well as how 
they transmit voting results. As an example, since 2000, Oregon conducts all elections 
through vote-by-mail systems while many other states, such as Louisiana and 
Mississippi, still vote almost entirely in-person. 
 With a high degree of complexity regarding how people vote from state to state 
comes an even higher complication for election security. Security must be guaranteed 
uniformly across the country, though the technology remains incredibly diverse. 
Though there are countless differences between states, there are still several common 
denominators. Regarding the methods employed to collect votes, all states use some 
varying combination of vote-by-mail systems and in-person voting that will be 
discussed throughout Chapter 2. Regarding the technology used throughout the election 
process, there are a few common machines that represent the vast majority of voters 
which will be the topic of Chapter 3. Observing commonalities between states reveals 
that there are several common security risks seen throughout the states. I will largely be 
discussing common security risks rather than focusing on each state’s unique problems, 
as the common risks have the largest implications on American election security. How 
these common risks can be exploited by foreign and/or domestic actors will be the topic 
of Chapter 4. Recommendations to alleviate these common risks will be proposed and 
analyzed throughout Chapter 5. 
Software Independence 
The term “software independence” in the context of elections refers to a modern 
computer science approach to how voting systems should work. The term bases its 




every piece of software and hardware in the world contains inherent security risks. 
Thus, the term “software independence” used in the realm of voting machines means 
that, in all voting processes, software should not be the only system used to collect and 
tabulate votes.2 Rather, there should be a blend of software and human functions to 
ensure accurate election results. The goal of software independence is to guarantee that 
an undetected error in a voting machine does not cause an undetected error in the 
election outcome. If each state’s electoral processes practice the ideologies of software 
independence, errors incurred throughout the voting process have a higher likelihood of 
being caught and corrected before election results are finalized.3 
Paper Trails 
One tactic commonly used to ensure software independence is the maintenance 
of a verifiable “paper trail.” In the context of electoral processes, paper trails are a 
physical product of each voter’s ballot selections. This commonly takes the form of 
physical voter ballots collected within each precinct, but also refers to physical voter 
pollbooks and tangible outputs from voting machines, such as a paper voting receipt. 
Paper trails play into the idea of software independence as they promote the use of a 
physical medium to check against the results of software. When the results produced by 
computers need to be checked with scrutiny or cannot be trusted due to alleged 
insecurity, precincts can affirm or deny election results by auditing their paper trails.4 
                                                 
2 Rivest, Ronald L. “On the notion of 'software independence' in voting systems.” Philosophical 
transactions. Series A, Mathematical, physical, and engineering sciences vol. 366,1881 (2008): 3759-67. 
doi:10.1098/rsta.2008.0149 
3 Ibid. 
4 US House of Representatives Committee on House Administration, and Matt Blaze. Document, 2020 




Both software independence and the production and use of paper trails are 
crucial metrics of election system security. Whether or not different voting mechanisms 
can reliably produce backups to affirm or deny election results is imperative to 
guaranteeing secure results. Machines should be viewed and utilized as a tool to aide 





Chapter 2: Voting Methods 
Introduction 
Understanding the technological security of American elections means first 
understanding and analyzing the different major methods of ballot collection. There are 
two major categories of ballot collection used throughout the states: mail-in voters and 
in-person voters. While the method utilized and the exact specifics of their use differ 
between states, these two categories of voters can be used to invoke discussions about 
the security of ballot collection generally. Both methods are inherently linked to ballot 
collection/tabulation machines which will be discussed throughout Chapter 3. 
Mail-In/Absentee Voting 
Mail-in and absentee voting refer to the same process: a single voter is mailed a 
single ballot which, after the voter submits said ballot, undergoes rigorous scrutiny by 
machines and local election officials to ensure that the results reflect the intended 
selections of each eligible voter. A part of this process involves ensuring that each 
person votes only once. Mail-in only states, such as Oregon, send a single ballot to 
every registered voter. For states that largely vote in-person, absentee ballots are mailed 
out on an “excuse” or “no-excuse” basis. An “excuse” meaning the voter must provide a 
valid reason as to why they could not vote in-person on election day, whether it be due 
to age, disability, absence, or other condition. A few examples of states that utilized 




Mississippi.5 In states where excuses are not required, such as in California, any voter 
can request to vote-by-mail and will subsequently be sent a ballot.6 In accordance with 
the Elections Clause, how the ballots are mailed out, received, checked for security, and 
counted differs from state to state.  
Due to the prevalence of the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2020 election saw a 
distinct uptick in the number of states that allowed voters to mail-in ballots. In states 
that still required excuses for absentee voting, excuses surrounding the pandemic, such 
as having to quarantine, being at higher risk, or displaying symptoms, could be used to 
receive a mail-in ballot. This led to over 65 million voters casting mail-in/absentee 
ballots in 2020, nearly doubling the 2016 mark of 33 million Americans.7 With such a 
stark increase in mail-in ballots, especially from states that traditionally have not 
allowed such widespread use, comes the question of whether the votes were truly 
secure. Past trends demonstrate that voting by mail is an incredibly secure system 
regardless of scale.  
The Heritage Foundation consistently updates a running database of a sample of 
election fraud cases throughout the United States. As of the start of 2021, according to 
the sample there have been 1,317 proven instances of voter fraud over approximately 30 
years, resulting in 1,134 criminal convictions.8 Of these proven instances, just 213 have 
                                                 
5 “Voting Outside the Polling Place: Absentee, All-Mail and Other Voting at Home Options.” National 
Conference of State Legislatures, September 25, 2020. https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/absentee-and-early-voting.aspx.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Desilver, Drew. “Most Mail and Provisional Ballots Got Counted in Past U.S. Elections – but Many Did 
Not.” Pew Research Center. Pew Research Center, November 10, 2020. 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/11/10/most-mail-and-provisional-ballots-got-counted-in-
past-u-s-elections-but-many-did-not/. 
8 “A Sampling of Recent Election Fraud Cases from Across the United States.” The Heritage Foundation. 




come from the fraudulent use of absentee ballots. In the same time span, over 250 
million mail-in votes have been cast. Such numbers show that 213 cases are statistically 
insignificant, even when taking into consideration the largest occurrence of mail-in 
voting in American history. Oregon, a state that has done all elections by mail since 
2000, has documented approximately 12 cases of criminal voter fraud out of over 100 
million ballots.9 Most of these cases came from people either trying to forge a different 
person’s signature, or by attempting to vote twice.  
Before the pandemic, 5 states had voting by mail as the sole mechanism for 
voting: Oregon, Hawaii, Colorado, Washington, and Utah.10 In these states, updated 
electronic voter registration rosters were used to send a single ballot to a single voter. In 
states that allow either in-person or mail-in/absentee voting, engaging in one option 
prevents the ability of a voter to use the other option as well. This ensures that each 
person could only cast a single ballot. Electronic rosters are consistently updated 
throughout the election process to determine the status of each voter’s ballot, including 
whether one had been cast and by which method.11  
To ensure that each mail-in/absentee ballot was cast by eligible voters on the 
voter registry, states use a variety of different processes. The most common is the 
signing of a voter affidavit assuring that the person submitting the ballot is who the 
ballot was addressed to. These signatures are checked with registration polls to ensure 
                                                 
9 The Editorial Board, “The 2020 Election Won’t Look like Any We’ve Seen Before,” The New York 
Times, March 21, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/21/opinion/sunday/coronavirus-vote-
mail.html. 
10 Lee, Michelle Ye Hee. “What's the Difference Between Absentee and Mail-In Voting?” Washington 
Post. Washington Post, August 18, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/08/18/whats-
difference-between-absentee-mail-in-voting/.  





they match before moving on to tabulation. Some states, such as California, Colorado, 
and Florida, ensure security through distinct, trackable barcodes or tally marks on each 
ballot that uniquely match to a single voter.12 In this manner, one person cannot request 
and cast two separate mail-in ballots. 
In most states that engage in mail-in/absentee voting, and in 46 states overall, 
voters can request and cast “provisional ballots.”13 The laws defining the eligibility of 
provisional ballots differ from state to state, but provisional ballots are typically used to 
allow citizens to cast ballots even if their voter eligibility is in question. The motivation 
behind provisional ballots is that a voter’s eligibility or identity may not be guaranteed 
based on voter registration status. For instance, a voter might be trying to vote in the 
state they are registered in but not the correct district, or their registration information 
had not yet been updated. Until voter eligibility is ensured, provisional ballots are not 
counted towards election results. Thus, the voter must verify their registration in that 
district before their vote is tallied. Provisional ballots are a strong security check that 
still guarantees the principles of democratic elections, as they allow all people to vote 
without affecting the final tally until the voter proves their eligibility. 
Once the paper ballots have been received and verified, they are finally counted. 
Voting machines tabulate mail-in ballots in largely the same manner as ballots cast at 
polling sites. The security of such voting machines will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
However, it is crucial to note that the security of casting and counting a ballot by mail is 
not inherently riskier than a ballot cast in-person. As far as current sampling can prove, 
                                                 
12 Danetz, Lisa. “Mail Ballot Security Features: A Primer.” The Brennan Center for Justice, October 16, 
2020. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/mail-ballot-security-features-primer.  





mail-in fraud happens at an infinitesimally small rate. As mentioned previously, in 
Oregon this rate has been about a dozen cases out of over 100 million ballots spanning 
two decades of voters.14 
Voting In-Person 
Until recently, filling out and/or turning in a ballot at physical polling centers 
was the traditional and most common method of voting. Voting in-person typically 
entails showing up at a polling center and requesting a ballot. Typically, this happens on 
election day, which is always on the Tuesday occurring from November 2nd to 
November 8th for federal elections. However, some states, such as Alabama, Maine, and 
many others, designate early voting periods where voters can cast ballots in-person in 
the weeks leading up to the election if they are unable to vote on election day itself. 
Once at a polling center, voters’ names are checked against either physical or electronic 
pollbooks to ensure that the voter is registered and eligible in that district. In some states 
or districts this requires strict proof of identification, such as with driver’s licenses or 
passports. In other states signatures are used. From here, states vary regarding how the 
voter casts their choice. Many jurisdictions allow the voter to fill out a physical ballot 
with a pen that is then submitted for later tabulation by machines. Other jurisdictions 
utilize some form of voting machine to designate a voter’s selections. Such machines 
will be described in Chapter 3. 
The potential issues with in-person voting are mainly the security risks inherent 
in many of the voting machines. Recently, however, there has been a growing attack 
                                                 
14 Weiser, Wendy R, and Harold Ekeh. “The False Narrative of Vote-by-Mail Fraud.” The Brennan 





against voters themselves committing alleged voter fraud throughout the nation. The 
largest and most controversial discussions have revolved around alleged “voter 
identification fraud,” wherein a person illegally casts a ballot while pretending to be 
someone else. The imitated person could be either alive or dead, and identification fraud 
can happen either at polling centers or through mail-in ballots. If real, voter 
identification fraud would have the result of allowing someone to cast multiple ballots 
for a single candidate, potentially altering the outcome of close elections. To prevent 
such voter fraud from occurring, 36 states currently require proof of identification 
beyond a signature at polling centers to vote.15 The exact laws vary from state to state, 
with the largest discrepancy being the types of identification accepted. Current debates 
on identification fraud question whether such laws are necessary. Advocates for the 
laws say that they make elections more legitimate, and opposers believe they are a 
discriminatory attempt to disenfranchise legitimate voters by making it more difficult to 
vote.16 
Early research supports the latter opinion: that most of these laws have costs that 
vastly outweigh their benefits. The Brennan Center for Justice shows that the incident 
rates of identification fraud are between 0.0003% and 0.0025%.17 This would mean that 
the average American has a higher likelihood of being struck by lightning than 
successfully impersonating someone else at the polls. Another study, conducted by the 
Republican National Lawyers Association (RNLA), found that, from 2000-2010, in 
                                                 
15 “Voter Identification Requirements.” National Conference of State Legislatures. National Conference 
of State Legislatures, August 25, 2020. https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-
id.aspx. 
16 Newkirk, Vann R. “How Voter ID Laws Discriminate.” The Atlantic, February 18, 2017. 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/how-voter-id-laws-discriminate-study/517218/.  





over 20 states there were 2 or fewer convictions of voter identification fraud.18 The state 
with the highest conviction number, Florida, had just 17 spread over the entire decade. 
Such data shows that, though voter identification fraud may sometimes occur, the 
perpetrators are largely unsuccessful, making paranoia surrounding the issue a case of 
smoke without fire. The few credible cases of voter identification fraud are irregularities 
in the overall electoral process, and far from the norm. The alteration of just a handful 
of votes over a decade long period with hundreds of millions of ballots cast is not 
enough data to suggest wide-scale voter fraud. 
                                                 
18 Hines, Debbie. “New Republican Data Shows No Need For Voter ID Laws.” Huffington Post, 




Chapter 3: Voting Machines 
Introduction 
Despite the diversity in voting laws among U.S. states, the core technology used 
throughout the United States remains largely consistent. The reason for this is because 
the market for voting machines is largely dominated by just 3 vendors: Election 
Systems & Software, the largest by a substantial margin, Dominion Voting Systems, 
and Hart InterCivic.19 Although each state utilizes different combinations of 
technology, a few common machines produced by the 3 major vendors represent almost 
the entirety of American voters. Throughout this chapter, I will be looking at each of 
these voting technologies in detail to explain the breadth of their use and how they 
work. I will use this information to detail the security risks inherent in each of these 
machines. Recommendations for eliminating these risks will be provided in Chapter 5.  
Pollbooks and E-Pollbooks 
Pollbooks come in either an electronic or physical form and form the basis for 
verifying voter eligibility. At their core, pollbooks are collections of voter data 
information used to help citizens register to vote, cast ballots, and verify identities. 
Pollbooks are not used to tally vote counts or hold ballot information, but often reflect 
the voting status of registered citizens. Pollbooks are essential to checking that a person 
is registered to vote and has not already cast a ballot in the election. They are often used 
at physical polling centers during check-in and are utilized in mail-in/absentee voting to 
                                                 
19 Fessler, Pam, and Johnny Kauffman. “Trips To Vegas And Chocolate-Covered Pretzels: Election 






decide where and who ballots need to be sent to. For a state like Oregon, where all 
voting is done by mail, pollbooks are used to send ballots to every legally registered 
voter. For states where you can vote in-person or also at a physical poll center, the 
pollbook is used to make sure the voter only uses one of the provided mechanisms.20 
Physical pollbooks are paper books containing a list of eligible voters in each 
district.21 They are largely secure insofar that the physical book can only be accessed by 
election officials. The real concern with physical pollbooks comes in their electronic 
form, e-pollbooks, which tend to produce the physical copy. E-pollbooks are incredibly 
similar to their physical counterpart, however they are connected to an online voter 
registry containing all the aforementioned voter information. Such electronic databases 
are now utilized across the country in the form of laptops and tablets as states have 
continued to modernize their electoral processes over the last few decades. As of 
October 2019, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), e-
pollbooks have been authorized by statute or have been used without explicit 
authorization to verify voters on election day in at least 41 states and D.C..22 There are 
many benefits to using e-pollbooks that have contributed to their growing popularity. E-
pollbooks provide real-time updates of voter history, ensuring that people cannot cast 
two or more ballots. Additionally, they can scan ID cards to pull up voter data, produce 
turnout numbers, can register voters on the spot, and allow poll workers to redirect 
voters to their correct districts, among other uses. 
                                                 
20 “Electronic Poll Books | e-Poll Books.” National Conference of State Legislatures, October 25, 2019. 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/electronic-pollbooks.aspx.  
21 Ibid. 




While e-pollbooks simplify and speed up the electoral process, there are inherent 
security risks involved with being constantly connected the internet. Cyberattacks could 
intercept internet signals fired off by the e-pollbook, allowing attackers to manipulate or 
delete voter data as well as block the transmission of identification verification 
practices. As will be discussed throughout Chapter 4, hackers have shown they are 
capable of breaking into virtual voter registries to manipulate or steal private voter 
information. Additionally, most states are not prepared in the event of a cyber-attack 
that causes the e-pollbooks to shut down entirely. If physical back-ups are not present, 
such attacks would stall or prevent voters from being able to cast their ballots as their 
information would be impossible to verify. States must take the risk of cyber-attacks 
into account when purchasing new e-book systems and when training poll workers to 
use such technologies.23 
Ballot Marking Device (BMD) 
Ballot marking devices (BMDs) are found in physical polling centers and are 
used to fill out paper ballots for the voter. Since lever-mechanisms are rarely used 
anymore following the events of the 2000 election, modern BMDs typically work 
through a touchscreen interface which voters interact with to select their candidates. 
After the voter inputs their choices, the machine prints out a paper card which the voter 
can check before submitting the ballot for later tabulation. BMDs are specifically 
designed with several services meant to assist disabled and elderly people in the voting 
process. Such machines rose to prominence following the Help America Vote Act of 
                                                 
23 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2018. Securing the Vote: Protecting 




2002, which mandated that each precinct must contain at least one accessible voting 
machine for disabled citizens.24 BMDs are used throughout the nation, and most states 
that utilize BMDs have expanded their use such that many non-disabled or elderly 
people vote on them as well. 
Ballot marking devices have many strengths that make them popular 
nationwide. Regarding security benefits, BMDs are not typically connected to the 
internet or any other network while voters are interacting with them, limiting the risk of 
remote hacking. Additionally, BMDs tend to allow voters to double-check their ballots 
after entering their selections and before turning the ballot in for tabulation. However, 
there are still fundamental technological issues surrounding BMDs that can slow down 
the voting process or introduce errors. Just as with all hardware tools, BMDs are 
entirely reliant on the software within them. Ballots need to be encoded into the system 
of BMDs for voters to be able to make their selections on the touch screen. Bugs 
resulting from the implementation of a ballot in the BMD’s system can have massive 
ramifications on the voter’s ability to vote for what/whom they intend. 
Furthermore, while allowing voters to check the paper receipt from the BMD 
realizes the idea of software independence and reflects the necessity of a paper trail, the 
security of BMD systems is entirely reliant on how reliably voters check for, and 
correct, ballot errors. If errors are consistently caught and corrected, then BMDs are one 
of the most secure voting machines utilized. However, there is a growing concern that 
voters tend to skip the process of review. Without consistent reviewing of ballots by 
voters, BMDs could introduce bugs into many voter’s ballots that go unnoticed for 
                                                 
24 US House of Representatives Committee on House Administration, and Matt Blaze. Document, 2020 




extended periods of time.25 This concern was tested in a study conducted by the 
University of Michigan Harker School.  
The study aimed to uncover how often voters noticed errors in the ballots 
produced by BMD systems. In the study, 241 candidates were asked to cast a vote on a 
BMD that was intentionally coded to introduce specific errors on their ballots.26 They 
then monitored how many voters checked their ballots and how many caught the error. 
To simulate the diversity of polling centers and poll workers that exist, they gave 
differing instructions to each candidate. The instructions ranged from no guidance 
following the voter receiving their paper ballot to asking each person individually if 
they had checked their ballot before turning them in. When no guidance was provided, 
only 39.7% of participants reviewed their ballot at all, and only 6.6% noticed an error 
and reported it to the poll workers.27 Many participants could not remember who/what 
they had voted for just seconds earlier. When intervention by poll workers occurred, 
64.3% of voters reviewed their ballot and 27.8% reported the error to the poll workers. 
This study shows that if BMDs are running with errors, the chance that these errors are 
caught and reported by voters is very low. Thus, it is crucial that poll workers not only 
encourage all voters to check their ballots, but also have the capability to probe BMDs 
for accuracy consistently. During election cycles where voters are consistently using the 
BMD machines, this can be done through manual tests on the BMDs throughout the 
day. 
                                                 
25 Appel, Andrew W., Richard A. DeMillo, and Philip B. Stark. "Ballot-marking devices cannot ensure 
the will of the voters." Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy 19, no. 3 (2020): 432-450. 
26 Bernhard, Matthew, Allison McDonald, Henry Meng, Jensen Hwa, Nakul Bajaj, Kevin Chang, and 
Alex Haldermann. “Can Voters Detect Malicious Manipulation of Ballot Marking Devices?,” University 





Optical Scan Ballot Readers 
Optical scan ballot readers are machines that take in physical ballots and keeps a 
running tally of voter choices for each selection. The machine stores the tally on 
removable memory devices that are directly connected to the system. Optical scan 
ballot readers are used on ballots collected through voter-marked ballots at polling 
centers, ballots received from absentee/vote-by-mail systems, or ballots produced by 
BMDs. After counting a ballot, the optical scan ballot reader typically locks away the 
voter’s original ballot in a mechanically secured box connected to the machine. While 
this guarantees security for physical ballots, it also means that the voter typically does 
not have access to their ballot after being put through the machine. Although optical 
scan ballot readers preserve a reliable paper trail, voters cannot fix errors or change their 
selections after insertion into the machine. 
The primary motivation for optical scan ballot readers is that they do not 
manipulate the voter’s original ballot, they simply tally the results of voter’s choices. 
Thus, they ensure software independence by keeping a verifiable paper trail through the 
preservation of the original ballots. Additionally, errors will only appear in tabulation 
rather than actually incorrectly marking a ballot for a voter. As such, so long as the 
voter ensures that their ballot selections are correct before submitting them, the work of 
optical scan ballot readers can be easily checked through human audits. These 
advantages have led to such machines gaining popularity throughout the nation. 




optical scan ballot readers as the primary method to count votes.28 An additional 19% of 
voters live in precincts that use optical scan ballot readers in conjunction with other 
tabulation machines.  
While optical scan ballot readers have many advantages, case studies highlight 
the potential risks inherent in such machines. In one case, in the wake of a contentious 
2008 Senate race in Minnesota, the state released 6,737 anonymous optically scanned 
ballot images to the public.29 These images represent the scan collected by the voting 
machine, as well as the result that each ballot produced. While the ballots were used on 
2008 machines, the core problems and security risks remain the same. One of the most 
prevalent risks identified was undetected failures in the reading of the voter’s ballots. 
Based almost entirely on how a user filled in their ballot bubbles, optical voting 
machines were shown to misread the voter’s selection by selecting an incorrect 
candidate, cancelling a box that a voter intended to vote for, or by not considering a 
vote altogether. The machines would only recognize clearly defined bubbles while not 
accounting for human errors in otherwise valid ballots. Thus, a voter could believe they 
filled out a ballot correctly while an optical scanner did not count their choice towards 
the results tally. 
The study found additional risks dependent on the layout of the ballot itself. The 
images studied showed that certain areas of the ballot misread more often than others, 
showing that a candidate’s location on the ballot might have large technological 
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implications on how many votes they received.30 Though the software can, and has, 
been improved regarding how ballots are read, there is still a risk that a vote may be 
miscounted or not counted at all. With optical scan ballot readers, the voter typically has 
no way to ensure that their ballot was counted as intended. There may have been a 
disconnect between which candidate the voter chose on the ballot and which one the 
optical scanner chose for the voter. While this can be double checked through the 
auditing of the intact paper trail produced, most precincts only run such audits in the 
case of close elections. When the election result seems clear, most jurisdictions will rely 
entirely on the machine’s result. This runs the risk of counting out certain voters 
entirely. While optical scanners may work well when user error is not introduced, they 
fall short when voters make errors, such as using non-conforming marking styles (See 
Figure 1) or attempting to cancel a vote (See Figure 2).  
The study shows that optical scan ballot readers both fail and excel at ensuring 
the idea of software independence. While a human component still exists through the 
physical ballot that is inserted into the optical scanner, the machines do not display 
critical reasoning in accounting for human errors. Optical scanners fall short of software 
independence as the scanning happens during the tabulation phase at the end of the 
electoral process, after the voter no longer has access to their ballots. Thus, there must 
be some degree of human reasoning when tabulating votes so that all votes are counted 
accurately and as intended. This human component could take form through consistent 
risk-limiting audits after each election, which will be described in Chapter 5. 





Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Voting Machine 
Direct recording electronic voting machines (DREs) are the epitome of voting 
machines in the digital age. To modernize electoral processes, DREs flooded onto the 
scene within the last two decades. The typical DRE systems are equipped with a touch 
screen like a BMD wherein voters make their choices. The base ballot that is presented 
to the voter is stored internally on the device on removable memory cards and 
programmed into the system. The largest difference between a BMD and a DRE is that 
once the voter makes their selections on a DRE they are tallied and stored on other 
removable memory cards rather than a physical paper ballot. In this manner, the voting 
process is entirely electronic. While some newer DREs produce a paper trail, a large 
amount of DREs in use today do not.   
Regarding paperless DRE systems, the Brennan Center found as late as 2019 
that 12 states still used paperless DREs as the primary polling device throughout many 
of their counties and towns. Of these 12, 4 states (Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, and 
South Carolina) use paperless DREs as the primary system throughout the entire state.31 
Such widespread use has led to 28% of Americans living in DRE-only jurisdictions as 
of 2016. An additional 19% live in jurisdictions that use a combination of DRE and 
optical scan ballot readers.32  
The prevalence of paperless DRE systems is troubling, as experts have shown 
time and again that they are one of the most insecure voting systems. Due to their 
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almost entirely digital nature, paperless DREs are susceptible to attacks that are not 
traditionally prevalent in machines that work with physical ballots. These attacks can 
take form in multiple ways, such as by deleting vote tallies stored in a DREs digital 
media or altering final result tabulations on the removable memory card to change 
votes. Through external interface ports, hackers can access data files stored on the 
machine’s internal and/or removable memory. Additionally, the ballots that voters use 
on these machines are themselves encoded in the machine. Since the ballots are stored 
on digital memory, tampering could be done to change the format or selections on the 
actual ballot itself.33 
The potential security risks of DRE systems do not end there. Hackers can also 
access electronic log files stored within the DRE to disrupt post-election audits and can 
even disable security software that detects when a machine has been tampered with. The 
hacker could upload a corrupt software that looks identical to the original but is 
maliciously altered to disturb the results. Even if the hacker did not replace the 
software, most DREs still have flawed software that allow hackers to exploit 
vulnerabilities that already exist.  
A 2007 study in California and Ohio showed that any of these exploitations 
could be done by a single person with no more access than the typical poll worker or 
voter.34 The study showcases that voters have more private access to DRE systems than 
any other voting machine. With extended access, a knowledgeable hacker could 
override passwords to disrupt the machine digitally or interfere with the physical 
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removable media of the machine. Though the study is over a decade old, many states 
still use the same machines be it due to cost of replacement or other reasoning. Thus, 
DRE systems are not only ill-equipped to deal with potential security flaws which can 
lead to inaccurate election results, but DREs also do not allow for secure post-election 





Chapter 4: Foreign Interference and Hacking Methods 
Introduction 
The previous sections have outlined many security risks that are present 
throughout the ballot collection and tabulation process in every single state. Such 
explanations show that America’s elections come with inherent risks as they continue to 
adapt to a technologically complex world. Though these risks could be exploited by 
domestic groups or individuals, it is much more likely that American elections will be 
hacked by some foreign body. The reason for this is because most domestic occurrences 
of exploiting vulnerabilities in voting technology have the goal of changing the number 
of votes for a given candidate. This ideology is akin to the older idea of stuffing ballot 
boxes to ensure victories. While such an attack may have massive implications for the 
future of the United States, they would have to occur on a large scale and thus are much 
less likely to occur and much easier to catch through post-election audits.  
A very real threat comes in the form of foreign interference, largely by 
exploiting technological vulnerabilities through cyberattacks. Foreign entities do not 
necessarily need to change the outcome of an entire election to achieve their goals. 
Rather, their goals tend to be centered around destabilizing the democratic institutions 
of the United States by planting a seed of doubt in the minds of American citizens. Such 
doubt can be achieved simply by calling the results into question by asserting their 
presence at any point throughout an election. This is a much easier goal to achieve than 




The goals described above is exactly what Russia attempted to achieve when 
interfering with the federal election of 2016.35 It is unlikely that they changed a single 
vote, but rather they simply asserted that they had the capability to do so through 
asserting their presence in private voter databases and machines. This represents a 
massive security breach that could happen at any time if the United States’ election 
infrastructure is not prepared, giving the foreign body access to millions of copies of 
private voter data and the potential to change ballots and steal secure voter data. 
Dissecting the 2016 election and the threat of foreign interference will be the topic of 
this section. 
What We Know From 2016 to Now 
In conducting research about the 2016 Federal Election, the most important 
document is the Senate’s Select Committee on Intelligence’s report on Russian Active 
Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election. Though the 
report comes chock full of redactions, there is still a wealth of information on how 
foreign states, namely Russia, interfered with the 2016 election. However, the story 
does not start in 2016. Rather, the Committee found that “The Russian government 
directed extensive activity, beginning in at least 2014 and carrying into at least 2017, 
against U.S. election infrastructure at the state and local level.”36 This means that 
Russian actors have been interfering with election systems since at least the 2014 
midterm elections, through the 2016 election, and likely continuing to the modern day. 
                                                 
35 United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Report, 1 Report of the Select Committee on 
Intelligence United States Senate on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 






As mentioned previously, Russian interference likely has not involved changing actual 
vote tallies, the Senate seems very certain that results were not changed. Rather, the 
goal of foreign interference in 2016 was to influence the general electorate into making 
specific candidate choices, as well as to show that they had the capacity to exploit 
systems further should they want to. 
Though Russia has been exerting efforts to interfere with federal elections since 
at least 2014, palpable interference gained momentum in 2016 just before the 
Democratic National Convention (DNC).37 The Main Directorate of the General Staff 
of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU), Russia’s military intelligence 
agency, hacked into DNC servers, as well as the email of the Chairman of Secretary 
Hillary Clinton’s campaign, John Podesta. The goal of the hack being to leak their 
private emails to the public through WikiLeaks, a website where people often 
anonymously publish classified information.38 The emails were likely hacked through a 
cyber-attack technique called “spear-phishing.” A spear-phishing attack entails sending 
emails that appear legitimate but contain links that, when pressed, contain vicious 
malware (computer viruses) that give the attackers prolonged access to the user’s 
system.39 In this case, that access was used to hack into email servers and steal private 
information. Discussions surrounding the private emails, largely based around their 
classified contents, would go on to dominate the DNC news cycle as well as cast a 
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shadow over Secretary Clinton’s entire campaign. Other information was stolen from 
both Republican and Democratic leaders, but such information was not leaked, and it 
remains a mystery what was done with this data. 
While such instances reflect an obvious concern for our nation’s cybersecurity 
infrastructures, the real danger comes with foreign actors attempting to delegitimize the 
actual voting process. Interference became apparent in July 2016 when the state of 
Illinois reported that there was unrecognized network activity on the Board of Electors’ 
Voter Registry. The attack resulted in the exfiltration of voter data, meaning an 
unauthorized transfer of voter data to the attacker.40 The FBI then issued a FLASH alert 
on August 18, 2016, to every state to check if certain suspect IP addresses identified 
from Illinois had been seen on any other state’s voting systems. An IP address is an 
“internet protocol” address that uniquely identifies any device on the internet as well as 
that device’s location. By tracking common IP addresses, the FBI hoped to track where 
the attacks were coming from. From this first FLASH alert, the FBI found that it was 
apparent that election infrastructure and voter databases had been probed by Russian IP 
addresses in at least 21 different states.41 A second FLASH alert, conducted in October 
2016, concluded that it was likely that all 50 states had been probed. While the probing 
activity differed from state to state, the common aspects of election infrastructure that 
were interfered with was voter identification information from private voter databases, 
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election system software for collecting and tabulating ballots, election-related web 
pages, and election service companies. 
The Senate Committee on Intelligence and the US Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) compared tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by the 
foreign actors to previously observed Russian TTPs to conclude that the Russians were 
in fact the ones probing election infrastructures.42 The DHS Intelligence Assessment on 
this issue reported that the actors were targeting election infrastructure for a myriad of 
purposes. Among these were to cause disruptive effects in American elections, 
undermine the confidence of the public in respect to the final tally, and to steal sensitive 
voter data. The first two points suggest that foreign actors are attempting to delegitimize 
American elections in the eyes of the public with the goal of having extremely 
disruptive effects on American democracy. However, it is the third point that represents 
the largest danger to election security, as stealing voter data requires direct access to 
voter registration databases, meaning foreign actors in voter registries could cause a lot 
more harm than just stealing data.  
The report by the Senate’s Committee on Intelligence shows that, by the end of 
2018, Russia had accessed up to 200,000 voter registration records in Illinois.43 While 
data about the other 49 states is not publicly available, the implications of the case in 
Illinois causes reasons to worry. Having access to voter registration records not only 
gives away the personal data of every individual voter, but also gives them the ability to 
change or delete voter data from the system entirely. While the Committee does not 
believe this occurred in 2016, it shows that foreign actors, specifically the Russians in 






this case, had the capability to massively alter both current and future elections if they 
had the goal of altering the databases. 
Foreign Interference on Election Websites 
The attacks used to access voter databases may take several forms. An 
extremely common and basic way employs the aforementioned spear-phishing method, 
wherein poll workers or others with direct access to voter registries are sent virus-ridden 
emails. However, spear-phishing is not a particularly advanced attack and is easy to 
avoid if those vulnerable of being hacked know what to look out for. There are many 
other types of database exploitation techniques that can also give complete access to 
online voter databases with the additional threat of being much harder to defend against. 
The best case to examine here would be Vermont’s Online Voter Registration 
Application (OVRA), which the DHS reported that cybersecurity officials detected 
multiple attempts to access on August 24, 2018.44 While the attacker here has not been 
disclosed, the TTPs have been. While, in this instance, the attacks were only conducted 
on one website in Vermont, the TTPs employed are commonplace among cybersecurity 
attacks on both election infrastructure and traditional websites.  
One of the attacks on the OVRA came in the form of cross site scripting (XSS). 
XSS is a form of “injection attack,” meaning some attacker provides malicious input 
into a program that gets processed and then executed. While there are many different 
types of XSS, attacks typically involve the injection of malicious scripts into safe 
websites that ask for user input where said input is not validated or encoded. The term 
“script” in this context refers to a series of commands that are given to a program. 





Scripts are often used to automate processes but can also be used maliciously to run 
unauthorized commands on otherwise secure browsers. With XSS, the scripts are given 
in the form of user input, such as when asking for a login name. Because the website 
believes the script is simply user input, the website thinks that the script is trustworthy 
and, as such, runs the malicious commands. The goal of a XSS attack is to attack the 
users of the website, often by redirecting them to insecure website locations where the 
attacker can steal personal data, such as credit card data, social security information, or 
passwords off their computers.45 
The OVRA also received seven Structured Query Language (SQL) injection 
attempts. SQL by itself is a programming language commonly used to access and 
manage database systems. SQL injection occurs when an attacker providing user input 
provides a SQL statement that will be read and executed by a database. The difference 
between SQL injection and XSS is that the goal of SQL injection is to attack the 
website’s database itself. XSS attempts to steal secure data from the user, whereas SQL 
injection attempts to access databases.46 The result of SQL injections could be the 
deletion or manipulation of otherwise secure voter databases, or unauthorized access to 
data stored within the database. If databases are not protected, attackers could gain 
access to all the information stored within a voter registration database through simple 
SQL commands. Luckily, the OVRA was able to fend off the seven attempts, but it is 
unclear how many voter databases in the country are prepared to do so. 
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The final type of attack that the OVRA received was a single attempted Denial 
of Service (DoS) attack, which also failed. DoS attacks do not attempt to steal data, 
rather their goal is to take down websites/services so that legitimate users are unable to 
use them for extended periods of time. DoS attacks are carried out by an attacker 
essentially overloading a service with internet requests. The attacker directs a constant 
stream of attempts over time such that the website either fails to respond or crashes 
entirely. While DoS attacks do not necessarily disturb data on their own, they prevent 
users of a service from being able to access it. Additionally, DoS attacks are often used 
to make a service vulnerable to future attacks such as those outlined above. In the 
context of election infrastructure, a successful DoS attack on a website such as the 
OVRA would prevent users from being able to register to vote, identify themselves at 
polling stations, or check the status of their ballots. While the service is down and 
vulnerable, the hacker could use the DoS attack in conjunction with other hacking 
methods to steal secure voter data. Again, the DoS attack on the OVRA was prevented, 
but the existence of such attacks reflects another security concern nationwide and the 
need for contingency plans. 
Foreign Interference Implications on Voting Machines 
Up to this point the discussion of foreign interference has revolved around voter 
registration databases and voting websites. However, such attacks in turn reveal 
imperfections about the voting machines described throughout Chapter 3. The Senate’s 
Committee on Intelligence found that potential hackers could gain remote access to 




voters.47 While offline machines tend to be protected from remote hacking, many 
machines, such as DREs and BMDs, connect to a local network at some point 
throughout the election process, often to download software containing ballot layouts 
onto the machine.  
For example, while best practices dictate that DRE systems should be 
disconnected from the internet, each machine needs to be programmed before the date 
of an election to put the correct ballot in place. The programming is often done by 
connecting the machine to a local network or by downloading software off some form 
of removable media, such as a thumb drive. If the computer responsible for producing 
and releasing the program is compromised, then every single system that utilizes the 
same code will also be compromised. Additionally, not all precincts follow best 
practices, meaning many DRE systems remain connected to local networks indefinitely. 
While connected to local networks, hackers could access any number of machines in a 
polling center. 
While remote hacking reveals a large concern with current voting machines, 
many of the machines used throughout the country can be easily hacked from within a 
polling place with no greater access than any typical voter would have. This is 
evidenced through the DEF CON Conference’s Voting Machine Hacking Village 
(“Voting Village”). DEF CON is an annual convention based around cybersecurity and 
hacking. Within the Voting Village, hackers of all different levels of expertise come 
into contact with a myriad of voting machines, including DREs, optical scan ballot 
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readers, BMDs, and electronic pollbooks.48 Each machine is authorized for use in at 
least one jurisdiction, and hackers attending the conference are encouraged to attempt to 
break into the machines through the access level any typical voter would have. The 
results of this experiment are alarming. Though the hackers have very limited expertise 
in voting machines specifically, the hackers managed to exploit vulnerabilities in every 
machine over the course of two days. Matt Blaze, a computer science researcher and 
organizer of the Voting Village, stated in a testimony to Congress that: 
Depending on the individual model of machine, participants have found 
ways to load malicious software, gain access to administrator passwords, 
compromise recorded votes and audit logs, or cause equipment to fail. In 
most cases, these attacks could be carried out from the ordinary 
interfaces that are exposed to voters and precinct poll workers.49 
Through the Voting Village, Blaze shows us that existing voting machines 
employed throughout the country are entirely fallible. The hacking attempts were not 
conducted by voting machine experts in an unrealistic lab setting. Rather, the machines 
were exploited in real-time settings by people with varying levels of expertise over the 
course of just a few days. Such interference would allow hackers to entirely disable the 
machines, change vote tallies, and generally produce enough damage to call the results 
of an election into question. Although local hacking of this variety has largely not 
occurred and would be incredibly difficult to carry out on a national scale, it could still 
influence local elections and call results from certain states into question in larger 
elections. We have seen from previous presidential elections the significance of even 
just a single state’s vote count being called into question. 
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Chapter 5: Recommendations 
Introduction 
The previous chapters described and assessed the risks of various voting 
methods, election infrastructures, and the implications and tactics of foreign actors. 
However, they have done little in the way of providing actual solutions to the prescribed 
problems. Recommendations are necessary because, as of 2017, the Department of 
Homeland Security has designated elections infrastructure as “critical infrastructure.”50 
This means that matters of election security receive the top priority of the federal 
government. This designation denotes that improvements need to be made in every state 
regarding election security, and that the federal government will help enact changes 
through funding, oversight, and proposed legislation. With a keener eye on election 
infrastructure comes a need for direction in how to approach changes, as not every 
representative is an expert on voting systems. Throughout this section, 
recommendations will be made with the goal of enhancing the technological security of 
election infrastructure without restricting access to the ballot. The recommendations are 
not ordered by importance and will be divided between in-person/mail-in voting, voting 
machines, voter databases, and voting procedures. 
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All Precincts Must Provide Means for Mail-In/Absentee Voters to Check the Status of 
Their Ballots at Any Point in Time 
To ensure that all ballots are counted as intended, states must ensure that any 
voting citizen who is voting by mail/absentee can check the status of their ballot at any 
point leading up to the election. Before casting a ballot, voters should be made aware 
that a ballot has been mailed to them. After submitting the mail-in ballot, voters should 
be able to check whether the ballot has been received and counted. This should be done 
through mail, email alerts, website portals, or mobile phone apps which only show the 
status of the ballot rather than any sensitive information or candidate choices. In this 
manner, voters are made readily aware of the status of their ballot without 
compromising secure data. A single response of “yes” or “no” regarding if a ballot has 
been received and/or counted would suffice. 
There are 45 states that supported online ballot tracking throughout the entire 
state in the 2020 Presidential Election.51 Of the 5 states that did not – Texas, Illinois, 
Mississippi, Missouri, and Wyoming – there are certain counties, such as Cook County 
in Illinois, that provide ballot tracking capabilities. Other states, such as Texas, provide 
ballot tracking only for military personnel.52 While these are steps in the right direction, 
ballot tracking must be implemented statewide for all mail-in/absentee voters. 
Additionally, of the 45 states that provided ballot tracking services in the 2020 
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Presidential Election, voters often had to opt-in or visit various websites with their 
private information to check their ballots in many states. Voters should automatically be 
enlisted in ballot tracking programs when registering to vote. Finally, such ballot 
tracking services should be available for all elections at all levels of government rather 
than just for federal elections, as all votes in every election matter. 
All Precincts Must Provide Means for Mail-In/Absentee Voters to Correct Ballot Errors 
If there are detectable errors on the ballot, such as an unmatched signature, 
name, or address, voters must be made aware through the aforementioned ballot 
tracking service and there must be a system in place to allow them to prove their 
identification. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, as of 
September 2020 there are 18 states that provide means for voters to correct ballot 
errors.53 The laws vary greatly from state to state, with some states allowing ballot 
corrections only up to election day and others allowing for correction up to two weeks 
following an election. Oftentimes voters are not made aware of when their ballots are 
rejected, which is why this service would go hand-in-hand with the aforementioned 
ballot tracking technology. 
Correcting ballot errors is not to say that voters should be able to change the 
selections they made. Rather, voters should be able to prove their identity and that they 
are eligible voters, thereby ensuring the validity of their selections. This is the same 
ideology as with provisional ballots, the only difference being that many mail-in voters 
are largely unaware of the status of their ballots. Provisional ballot casters know they 
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have to verify their eligibility for the ballot to be counted, whereas mail-in voters may 
submit a ballot they believe to be valid that ends up not being counted. The Pew 
Research Center shows that, in the 2016 election, more than 400,000 mail-in votes were 
not counted. The largest reason for this, coming out to approximately 28.3% of rejected 
absentee ballots, was because of non-matching signatures.54 While it is good that 
security measures reject such errors rather than include them during tabulation, voters 
who voted legally should be able to prove their identification and have their ballot 
count. With such systems in place, greater scrutiny could be applied towards security 
measures when scanning ballots as there would be a system in place to verify each voter 
in question. 
Voting Machines 
Only Use Machines that Provide a Verifiable Paper Trail/Abandon Paperless DREs 
All voting machines should be able to ensure software independence through 
their ability to produce a verifiable paper trail. Paper trails are important as they provide 
a safeguard against the possible corruption of a voter machine. When verifiable paper 
trails are utilized properly, all work done by voting machines can be double checked by 
a human hand. Should machines generally malfunction or get hacked to produce 
incorrect results, the original paper ballots would be able to be checked to detect 
alterations. 
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Producing a verifiable paper trail means phasing out voting machines that do not 
adequately support paper ballots. As an example, paperless DRE systems do not come 
into contact with or produce a paper ballot at any point throughout the electoral process. 
Rather, voters input their selections into a programmable ballot displayed on a touch 
screen and the results are saved in the system’s storage. As thus, such voting machines 
should be phased out of use and replaced with machines that allow results to be checked 
by humans. 
Having a verifiable paper trail does not mean all voting machines must be 
phased out of the process entirely. On the contrary, paper ballots can be marked and 
counted by machines and still produce a reliable paper trail. Most BMDs already have 
this functionality, with some having the added bonus of allowing voters to check their 
selections before tabulation. Paperless DREs are the primary culprit in this discussion, 
as the entire voting process, from casting to tabulation, occurs within the memory 
device on the machine. Paperless DREs make it much more difficult to catch fraud. 
Additionally, if fraud were to occur, the original intent of the voters could be lost. There 
must be some physical receipt that matches each voter to their selections such that the 
receipts can later be examined in post-election audits. 
All Voters Should Be Able and Encouraged to Check Physical Paper Receipts from 
Machines for Errors 
To ensure that the paper trails produced by machines are accurate, machines that 
produce paper trails should allow the voters to check the paper receipts before 
submitting them to poll workers. This is akin to a voter double-checking their physical 




return at the minimum a copy of the paper receipt. Voters should be encouraged by poll 
workers at polling stations to check the results of the machines to ensure all machine 
results are what the voter intended.  
The same should be done for machines that scan physical ballots, such as optical 
scan ballot readers. Many optical scan ballot readers lock the original ballot into a box 
without allowing the voter to see how it counted their ballot. While this ensures a paper 
trail, the machine should also output a separate physical receipt for the voter stating the 
voter’s selections such that the voter can verify the results of the machine. If this is not 
possible, then the machine should show the result of the voter’s choices on the 
touchscreen, manually making the voter verify their selections are accurate. If the 
scanning does not occur with the voter present, the outcome of the tabulation should be 
trackable on the aforementioned ballot tracker. With ballot tracking technology it is 
unwise to transmit the exact ballot, but systems could notify voters on whether or not 
the ballot was counted. To check tabulation, risk-limiting audits should be conducted by 
experts after each election. Risk-limiting audits will be discussed further below. 
Voter Databases/Pollbooks 
Election Officials Should Routinely Probe Voter Databases to Ensure Integrity 
Election officials in every state must develop procedures for routinely checking 
online voter database systems. The 2016 general election and the 2018 hacking efforts 
on Vermont’s voter registry emphasize the need for constant surveillance, especially in 
the months leading up to an election. There are several basic ways to probe voter 
databases to check for any sorts of tampering. The first is through checking the internet 




addresses are unique identifiers for all devices connected to the internet. Through cross-
comparing IP addresses with other states and the DHS, precincts should be able to 
identify suspicious activity coming from inside and outside of the country. IP addresses 
that are constantly changing or are performing irregular amounts of activity in 
comparison to the average user are examples of where the system may be compromised. 
Another way to check for irregularities is through monitoring spikes in database 
usage. If a hacker can gain administrative access to a database network through a user 
account, then the hacked user tends to attempt to give themselves heightened privileges 
which give them increased access to the system. If authorized users are performing an 
irregular number of functions and activities, especially if coming from unknown 
geographic locations, then that user may be hacked. Spikes in database usage can come 
from unauthorized or anonymous accounts as well. The aforementioned SQL injection 
cyberattack is an example of this, as the HTTP response to an injection attack will 
typically be much larger than a normal HTTP response. An HTTP response is between 
the server, such as a voter registry, and a client, such as a hacker.55 They are the primary 
tool used on the internet to provide users with the information they request. Requesting 
a large amount of information entails a larger HTTP response, which can be tracked to 
suspicious behavior if large responses are irregular. The reason for this is because 
hackers tend to download large databases to get as much secure information as possible. 
This can take terabytes of data, which is much larger than a usual request. Election 
administrators should monitor the number of downloads and alterations coming from a 
database, as many of either could mean the system has been compromised. 
                                                 





 Finally, election administrators should monitor when databases go down and 
assess reasoning for as to why. Denial of service attacks (DoS) that aim to take 
functions offline are a common way that hackers can make an otherwise secure system 
vulnerable to future attacks. Such attacks tend to be designated by websites going down, 
slowed speeds, and general poor system performance. All of this data is trackable. In all 
cases where potential hacking may have occurred, the DHS should be notified 
immediately such that other states can check their databases for unusual activity as well. 
It is imperative the DHS is contacted immediately, as the case of 2016 shows that by the 
time the FBI got involved at least 21 states had been probed.56 
Create Firewalls Between All Voting Processes and the Internet 
The term “firewall” originally comes from the construction industry in reference 
to flame-proof barriers meant to limit or stop fires. In the world of computing, firewalls 
are a digital security device that filters internet requests coming in and out of a service. 
Their purpose is to stop suspicious activity from breaching some private service while 
still allowing access for authorized users. There can be many layers to a firewall, each 
protecting against different types of attacks. A large way this is accomplished is through 
the monitoring of HTTP requests. Anytime somebody does something on the internet, 
such as clicking on a webpage, an HTTP request is sent from the client computer to 
whatever server the user is attempting to access. If the request is accepted, the server 
will then send back an HTTP response containing the requested data. 
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Firewalls for voter database servers would live between the client and the server 
and filter the requests accepted from the client. A way many servers accomplish this is 
by managing the types of requests that the server will accept from different sources that 
try to access it. For example, firewalls could be configured to allow requests for 
credentialed users to view their own information, while simultaneously blocking 
requests where users try to manipulate their information or access other private records. 
In short firewalls could be configured to block certain types of HTTP requests which 
would lead to the alteration or destruction of databases. As a more discrete example, 
PUT requests are used to create/update resources and DELETE requests are used to 
remove resources. The GET request is used to request information. In the context of a 
voter registry, a firewall could block PUT/DELETE requests entirely unless authorized 
by a trusted user, such as an election administrator. While firewalls do not provide a 
completely impermeable defense against cyberattacks, they serve as a strong additional 
layer of security on top of other security measures.  
Online Pollbooks Must Have Physical Backups 
Due to the nature of online pollbooks, namely the fact that they are intertwined 
with internet networks, there must be physical backups. In the case that hackers, either 
foreign or domestic, can access databases, physical backups are necessary to preserve 
an accurate copy of currently registered voters. The motivation behind this 
recommendation is similar to the motivation behind verifiable paper trails for voting 
machines. Namely, there should be physical backups for all electronic services so that 
the electronic services can be verified. With two different modes of record keeping, 




have been altered. Additionally, if online databases were to go down, physical backups 
allow for voting processes to continue at physical locations while precincts attempt to 
get the databases back online. 
Voting Procedures 
Discourage/Prevent Voters from Voting Through Online Formats 
 As technology continues to develop, there have been growing conversations 
about potentially allowing citizens to vote remotely from their own homes through the 
internet. While convenient, domestic cybersecurity technology is not nearly advanced 
enough to allow this to occur. If foreign actors can breach official government websites, 
then there is no question whether they could block or alter transmissions from remote 
devices on home internet connections. Currently, the only people that vote online are 
military personnel serving overseas and certain citizens abroad that are registered in 
states that allow it.  
Even though a select few citizens already vote online, experts believe that what 
they are doing is incredibly insecure. An audit conducted by MIT found the Voatz app, 
the voting platform used by West Virginia and Oregon to facilitate ballot casting and 
collection to the few citizens that can vote online, to be dangerous to the integrity of 
elections. MIT researchers Michael Specter, James Koppel, and Daniel Weitzner wrote 
in the audit report that “Given the severity of failings discussed in this paper, the lack of 
transparency, the risks to voter privacy, and the trivial nature of the attacks, we suggest 
that any near-future plans to use this app for high-stakes elections be abandoned."57 
                                                 
57 Newman, Lily Hay. “Voting App Flaws Could Have Let Hackers Manipulate Results.” Wired. Condé 




Such strong words from leading experts shows that the technological capabilities of 
election infrastructure are not yet advanced and secure enough to prevent attacks, and as 
thus should be avoided in favor of paper-based methods. Due to the limited nature of 
online voting this insecurity has not posed a large issue thus far. However, efforts to 
expand online voting should not be undertaken until the platforms exemplify their 
ability to reject advanced cyberattacks. 
Risk Limiting Audits Should be Used After Every Election 
Risk limiting audits are a method of confirming election results based on 
statistics. The method is to review a random sample of physical paper ballots to 
determine that the outcome claimed by computers matches that of the verifiable paper 
trail.58 This review is done entirely by humans and confirms or denies electoral results 
based on sampling a large number of ballots with a high statistical significance. Risk 
limiting audits are the reason behind software independence, as states must be able to 
verify machine results against a human hand. While many states conduct audits when 
elections are close, audits should be conducted after every Federal election regardless of 
the outcome. For local elections, audits should be done when the jurisdictions have the 
resources to do so. It is the best current way to verify an election’s result by proving 
there has not been machine tampering. 
 In accordance with previous recommendations, states should only be purchasing 
and using voter equipment that allows for risk limiting audits to be conducted through a 
verifiable paper trail. As of February 2020, there only 3 states that require risk limiting 
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audits after elections by statute: Colorado, Virginia, and Rhode Island. There are 3 more 
states that have implemented statutory pilot programs to test the feasibility of such 
audits: Georgia, Indiana, and Nevada.59 There are 6 more states that have begun to 
implement risk limiting audits in some form. This means that there are 38 states that are 
not prepared to perform audits when elections may be insecure. Such states are 
susceptible to election attacks as the results of their machines cannot be verified. 
                                                 






In conclusion, as the United States continues to adapt to an increasingly 
technological world comes increasing threats to election security. These risks do not 
come in the form of traditional voter fraud covered in the media, such as voter 
identification fraud. Rather, elections are most likely to be exploited through the 
technology used to facilitate the electoral process. Paperless voting machines, such as 
many types of DREs used throughout the nation, pose a major risk as they prevent the 
ability to accurately audit elections. In order for the collection of ballots to be secure, 
software independence needs to be maintained through verifiable paper trails and post-
election audits. Regarding voter registries, the 2016 election showed that they are not 
fully capable of fending off attacks from foreign or domestic hackers. While the 
Department of Homeland Security has designated elections infrastructure as “critical 
infrastructure,” further attention and efforts need to be made to increase cybersecurity.  
Though there have been no signs of election results being changed, there has 
been evidence that foreign and domestic actors have had the capability to do so either 
through online voter registries or through voting machines. Therefore, it is essential that 
government actors begin, if they have not already, to implement the types of 
recommendations I made throughout this paper, as well as the recommendations of the 
countless professional experts in the field, in order to further guarantee the security of 
future elections at all levels. Elections must continue to be fair with each voter 
confidently knowing that the ballot they cast is counted equally and as intended. The 
only way to guarantee this fundamental democratic principle is by ensuring the 






Figure 1: Non-Conforming Marking Styles60 
Depicts 3 marked ballots submitted by voters in Minnesota wherein the voter used a 
marking style unrecognized by optical scan ballot readers. In this case, a circle or 
checkmark was used rather than the correct filling in of the candidate’s bubble. 
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Figure 2: Attempts to Cancel a Vote61 
Depicts three marked ballots submitted by voters in Minnesota wherein the voter 
attempted to cancel their vote for one candidate, resulting in the cancellation of the 
ballot entirely.
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